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The Extreme Risk Problem for 
Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates 
Abstract 
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at 
mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary 
policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of 
leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such 
variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use 
both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such 
extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euro-
convergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the 
Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
Keywords: monetary policy rules, tail-risks, convergence to the euro, global 
financial crisis, equity market risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate 
risk 
JEL classification: E44, F31, G15, P34 
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Das Problem extremer Risiken für die Geldpolitik 
der Euro-Kandidatenländer 
Zusammenfassung 
Wir argumentieren, dass die Geldpolitik in den Euro-Kandidatenländern darauf abzielen 
sollte, die exzessive Instabilität in den zentralen Ziel- und Instrumentenvariablen der 
Geldpolitik zu mildern, insbesondere in Phasen turbulenter Finanzmärkte. Die 
empirischen Tests der Studie decken einen erheblichen Grad an Leptokurtosis auf, d. h. 
die Dominanz von so genannten Tail-Risks in den bedingten Volatilitätsserien der 
monetären Variablen in den Euro-Kandidatenländern. Ihre Zentralbanken wären daher 
gut beraten, neben den üblichen Instrumenten der Geldpolitik auch unorthodoxe 
Maßnahmen der Geldpolitik anzuwenden, wenn sie die Länder aus der Krise 
herausführen und danach auf die Übernahme des Euro vorbereiten. Damit erhielte die 
Geldpolitik jene Flexibilität, die ihr bei der Anwendung von Instrumentenregeln á la 
Taylor oder der Maastricht-Kriterien  fehlt.   
Schlagworte: Regeln der Geldpolitik, Tail-Risks, Euro-Konvergenz, weltweite 
Finanzkrise, Vermögensrisiko, Zinsrisiko, Wechselkursrisiko  
JEL-Klassifikation: E44, F31, G15, P34 
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I Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has markedly altered monetary policy strategies 
and tactics of central banks around the world.1 As a result of this crisis, monetary policy 
implementation cannot be based on parsimonious instrument rules à-la-Taylor that are 
derived from a historical relationship between the inflation gap and the output gap.  At 
least two reasons underscore this intricacy.  First, most of the central banks in the largest 
economies have been recently forced to enact quantitative easing strategies with zero-
bound interest rates that fall below the rates implied by standard Taylor rules (Ahrend, 
2008; Orlowski, 2010). Second, interest rates and other financial variables that serve as 
instrument or policy monitoring parameters for central banks have been very unstable, 
vulnerable to sudden volatility outbursts (Orlowski, 2010). The recent episodes of “tail 
risks”, i.e. extreme shocks to volatility of these financial variables impair monetary 
policy implementation based on parsimonious rules that commonly assume normal 
distribution of its key variables thus routinely ignore their leptokurtic time-pattern. In 
essence, these extreme volatility shocks have inhibited monetary policy transmission 
mechanism and deteriorated efficiency of the standard interest-rate policy (Curdia and 
Woodford, 2010, Svensson, 2010).  
Considering the recent prevalence of tail risks embedded in global financial market 
variables we aim to investigate the scale and proliferation of these extreme risks in the 
euro-candidate countries (ECCs).  We further discuss repercussions of these extreme 
risks for monetary policies on the passage toward the euro adoption.  Our empirical 
investigation is focused on detecting extreme volatility of the selected financial market 
variables, namely, equity market indexes, interbank rates and exchange rates, all of 
which are relevant for monetary policy-making in the converging economies. We 
analyze volatility patterns of these variables in the ECCs that are pursuing relatively 
independent monetary policies with flexible exchange rates, including the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Romania. For comparative purposes, we also include 
Slovakia that has adopted the euro as of January 2009, while it embraced a flexible 
exchange rate regime during the euro-convergence period. We employ GARCH 
volatility tests augmented with the in-mean GARCH variance (as a proxy of a risk 
premium or discount).  For the purpose of evaluating the degree of leptokurtosis, i.e. the 
prevalence of tail risks embedded in the conditional volatility patterns, we assume the 
generalized error distribution (GED) parameterization. Our working assumption is that 
the estimated GED parameters of the examined financial market variables are 
considerably lower than 2, indicating prevalence of severe tail risks.   
                                                 
1 A first version of this paper has been presented at the AEA convention in Atlanta, Januar 2010. We 
gratefully acknowledge the comments made by Paul J. Van den oord (DG Ecfin, Brussels) and Ali 
Kutan (Southern Illinois University), and Juliane Scharff (IWH. Simone Lösel (IWH) provided 
excellent assistance. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.   
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Section II of our paper overviews the pertinent literature addressing the sources of 
extreme risks and discussing their severity during the recent crisis. The setup of our 
analytical models is explained in Section III. The empirical results based on the 
GARCH-M-GED testing are presented and discussed in Section IV. The concluding 
Section V provides some suggestions for proper monetary policy responses to the 
incidence of extreme risks embedded in the examined financial market variables. 
II Monetary Policy Rules: Accounting for Tail-Risks 
A central point of interest in our analysis is whether monetary policy can be effective 
for containing risks, particularly the types of risks that have been precipitated by the 
ongoing global systemic crisis. There is no common answer to this conundrum in the 
literature. A standard prescription based on the actual policies following the Great 
Depression of the 1930s is that monetary policy cannot effectively contain the crisis 
because it is unable to lower the cost of credit in the presence of severe shocks to 
credit markets from the financial crisis. However, fiscal policy, in part in emerging 
markets, is even more constrained, since the injection of large spending amounts into 
the economy raises public debt, its cost, and has already raised the risks of sovereign 
default in some countries, including those in Europe. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: 
chapter 12) have shed light on the limited capacity of emerging markets to engage in 
fiscal stimulus. Hence, we find Mishkin’s (2009) and Jobst’s (2009) argument plausible 
that there is a leading role for monetary policy to overcome the current crisis and to 
ensure a stable financial development in the future. Yet, the question remains whether 
the emerging markets, among them the Euro Candidate Countries (ECCs) possess 
sufficient monetary policy tools to respond effectively to financial crises. 
With respect to the current crisis, there is a general consensus that substantial monetary 
policy easing has been indispensable (Curdia/Woodford, 2010). The recent vast, 
unprecedented liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve and other central banks 
have helped alleviate a severe economic recession. Without these liquidity injections 
the cost of credit would be very high, which would precipitate systemic risk and 
lead to high credit spreads. The recent expansionary monetary policies have helped 
reduce interest rates on risk-free securities and stifle credit spreads. These liquidity 
injections have reduced the credit spreads to a more normal level preceding the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in August 2009. In essence, central banks in the 
advanced economies have become ‘lenders of first (rather than last) resort’. They have 
extensively engaged in providing liquidity to banks, which stopped trusting each other, 
particularly in the aftermath of the global credit squeeze stemming from the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers Inc., in early October 2008. However, there is no consensus about 
whether monetary policy should promptly return to ‘the set of principles for setting 
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interest rates that worked well during the Great Moderation’ in the aftermath of the 
crisis, as suggested by Ahrend (2008) and Taylor (2009).  
The answer to this question lies in the real world behavior of key monetary policy and 
financial variables and, obviously, in the underlying behavior of agents in a monetary 
economy. We believe that a leptokurtic distribution of these variables is ubiquitous 
(Orlowski, 2008b, Miskin, 2009). If such distribution takes place, volatility of these 
variables is well-contained during normal market periods, but it tends to jump 
significantly at turbulent times. Hence, a leptokurtic distribution entails substantial tail-
risks. Approximations of variable fluctuations based on the assumption of a normal 
(Gaussian) distribution tend to severely underestimate de-facto risks at turbulent 
(financial crisis) periods. The roots of these tail-risks are quite complex. Among the 
main causes are unanticipated corrections of asset prices and – as in the recent crisis - a 
bank credit freeze due to a rapid increase of liquidity risks (rapidly depreciating assets 
that cannot be easily liquidated). It has been pointed out in the literature that money 
supply is strongly and positively related to the price of assets (Minsky, 1982a and 
1982b; Borio and Drehmann, 2008, 2009). If part of the money supply is endogenous, 
the balance sheet of financial institutions will expand along with the price of assets, 
creating its own credit and money. In this case one should consider that an approaching 
asset price bubble might induce market interest rates to rise due to the rising demand for 
investment goods to be produced and for their financing. If asset price inflation passes 
through to income inflation, the central bank’s loss function would signal higher losses, 
and the bank would increase its policy rate – hence, acting pro-cyclical – it would signal 
that investing in assets would be even more profitable. A minor ‘not-unusual’ surprise 
(Minsky,1982a) or an exogenous shock like contagion would be a puncture to the asset 
bubble with a depreciation of debt and deflation and output decline following. This is 
the point when a tranquil period turns into a turbulent one, reflected in elevated 
volatility and risk of monetary and financial variables. The underlying leptokurtic 
distribution of the key monetary and financial variables seems to be in line with 
Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis (Minsky 1982a, 1982b), and Kindleberger’s 
(2005) history of ‘manias and crashes’, and it is in line with the origin and course of the 
present financial crisis on the U.S. home market.  
The leptokurtosis or tail-risks problem in a market economy raises severe challenges for 
central banks – mainly with respect to their loss function and their reaction function.2 A 
first challenge is that both functions are based on judgments about the development of 
flow aggregates (commodity prices, output, interest rates), assuming that deviations 
from target or equilibrium positions are either caused by the business cycle or stochastic 
shocks. However, leptokurtosis results mainly from asset price movements, hence from 
judgments of agents about the long-term development of the price of the stocks of 
                                                 
2 We omit discussion of other important assumptions like the central bank’s knowledge of a welfare 
function or a clear articulation of optimal policy rules (see Polito and Wickens, 2008).  
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financial or real assets. Indeed, there is evidence that central bank policies become 
ineffective during the periods of monetary tightening aimed at abating asset price 
inflation. For the U.S., Minsky observed the problem in the case of the credit crunch of 
1966, the liquidity squeeze of 1969-1970, and the debacle of 1974-1975. Actually, the 
financial industry bypassed the restriction by producing financial innovations and 
extending credit. ‘Monetary constraint in a situation in which ongoing investment 
activity leads to a rising demand for finance is effective only as it forces a sharp break in 
asset values’, he concludes (Minsky 1982a: 77). The most recent example has been 
provided by the Federal Reserve attempt to reduce inflationary pressure by increasing 
the federal funds rate in 2004-2006; the whole financial innovation business became 
toxic when financial institutions circumvented these restrictions (Orlowski, 2008b).  
The second problem lies with the central bank’s reaction function. In the tranquil period 
preceding the recent global financial crisis (the ‘Great Moderation’), economic theory 
recommended monetary authorities to adopt non-discretionary, instrument-rule-based 
policies with adjustments of the short-term interest rate as the predominant policy 
tool (Taylor, 1993). Most commonly, an inflation target, supplemented with output 
gap and/or exchange rate stability serve as key policy goals. The underlying assumption 
is a normal distribution of events in time. Svensson (2003) questions the effectiveness 
of rigid Taylor rules when the distribution of the variables is asymmetric, and proposed 
target rules with more discretion. The recent financial crisis has underscored the 
importance of active responses to ‘tail-risk’ or very large increases in volatility of the 
key monetary variables associated with their leptokurtic distribution (Orlowski, 2010). 
For this reason, non-discretionary policies based unconditionally on a simple Taylor rule 
are likely to be inadequate for containing tail-risks. In essence, the underlying risks 
associated with the episodes of elevated volatility of the policy variables can be 
managed more effectively with discretionary policies.  
In the tranquil period preceding the recent crisis, adjustments of short-term interest rates 
have served as a predominant monetary policy instrument. Such parsimonious approach 
seems no longer relevant in light of the recent crisis, which has precipitated the need for 
massive liquidity injections to global financial institutions through central banks’ 
purchases of risky assets. As a result, monetary policies of both highly developed and 
emerging market economies cannot simply focus on a single policy target. The policy 
target formulas have become more complex, incorporating not only price stability, but 
also economic growth, exchange rate stability and, perhaps most importantly, on 
containment of a broad spectrum of risks, including a broader viewed systemic risk, 
supplemented with a control or more specific risk categories such as the market-, 
liquidity-, credit-, default-, exchange rate-, counter-party- and other risks factors in the 
financial sector and the real economy.  
A third challenge is rooted in the erosion of the central banks’ independence. We do not 
have in mind the loss of independence due to a change in the position vis-á-vis 
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governments, but due to liberalization and deregulation of capital flows and markets. 
With constraints to independence, a central bank has a limited ability to counteract 
financial crisis episodes, particularly in the case of emerging markets whose currencies 
are not used by central banks for international reserves. A theoretical explanation of this 
phenomenon can be found in Wolfson (2002) who states that the debt-deflation 
character of a crisis turns into a debt-devaluation interaction through which the 
volatility process in the key monetary and financial variables becomes strongly affected 
by international events. In the tranquil period, free capital flows and deregulated 
markets attract local agents to borrow in the reserve instead of the local currency as long 
as interest rates on the reserve currency credit are lower than the local currency credit 
rates. As a result, the local central bank de facto and gradually loses economic 
independence, and the steady inflow of foreign capital becomes increasingly difficult to 
sterilize. Higher domestic policy rates attract more foreign credit and induce a local 
currency appreciation. When asset-liability positions in the reserve currency country 
become entail greater risks, depreciation of non-reserve currencies poses a real threat to 
local debt positions denominated in foreign currency. Then, the ability of the central 
bank to act as a lender of last or ‘first’ resort is restrained and depends on the access to 
reserve currency.  
A similar process of diminishing central bank independence has affected the ECCs – all 
with non-reserve currencies, particularly in the aftermath of a far-reaching liberalization 
of capital flows and financial sector deregulation as necessitated by their active 
preparation to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria (Gabrisch, 2009). With 
currencies which are rarely accepted for international credit, high interest differentials 
between domestic and foreign currency credits have strengthened incentives for local 
agents to take debt in foreign currency. A rising demand for foreign credit has bolstered 
capital inflows. Moreover, widening interest rate spreads have contributed to the 
appreciation of local currencies, which steady course has diminished the exchange rate 
risk.  
The most severe reduction of central bank independence has been experienced in the 
four currency board countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which have 
chosen the adoption of the euro as exit strategy. These countries are squeezed between 
the inability to adopt the euro officially and the inability to devalue. Any room for 
monetary policy maneuver depends on agreements with foreign monetary authorities 
to provide a reserve currency (as in the cases of Estonia through the swap agreement 
with the Swedish Riksbank in 2009 or Latvia through the IMF support). 
In the next section, we aim to evaluate the magnitude and precipitation of leptokurtosis 
or tail-risks of the monetary variables in the EECs in order to suggest an appropriate 
course of their monetary policies during preparations of the euro adoption. Our 
empirical examination of tail-risks embedded in the key monetary policy variables in 
EECs is conducted for the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Romania as the euro 
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candidates that are following relatively flexible monetary regimes, and for a 
comparative analysis also for Slovakia that has adopted the euro since January 2009. A 
strong evidence of tail-risk would call for a more discretionary approach to monetary 
policy that is disentangled from its steady course implied by a Taylor rule. The countries 
in question have announced inflation targeting without a formal disclosure of a specific 
instrument rule (Orlowski, 2005 and 2008a). However, a recent examination of a 
possible adherence of the ECCs to open-economy instrument rules conducted by 
Orlowski (2010) suggests that the inflation gap is still a predominant driver of the Czech 
and the Polish central banks’ reference rates. In contrast, adjustments in the Hungarian 
reference rates are associated mainly with changes in the exchange rate gap. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that the central bank reference rates respond to the task of lowering 
the output gap. In light of these findings, we prescribe to the Svensson (2003) argument 
that a targeting rule is less rigid than an instruments rule. However, we intend to 
examine whether the flexible inflation targeting policy enacted by ECCs has played any 
role in lowering extreme risks associated with the recent financial crisis.  
A strong evidence of tail-risks in ECCs would call for a more discretionary approach to 
monetary policy that is disentangled from its steady course implied by a Taylor rule. We 
focus our analysis on three types of market risks that affect directly monetary policy 
decisions: equity market risk, interest rate risk, and exchange rate risk. 
III Model Set Up and Data 
Monitoring equity market risk is an important task for monetary authorities, particularly 
at times of financial distress. Although volatility of equity market risk is not customarily 
entered in central bank loss functions or instrument rules, it has far-reaching 
reverberations in the credit markets, capital flows, financial and tangible investments, 
and exchange rate movements that all affect the conduct and direction of monetary 
policies.  In fact, it has been documented in the literature that precipitation of equity 
market risk, proxied by increases in the VIX volatility index in the U.S., had strong 
spillover effects on credit and liquidity risks during the course of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis (Mizen, 2008; Orlowski, 2008b).  In essence, equity market volatility 
dynamics are a good reflection of the investors’ confidence in the country’s financial 
stability and resiliency against external financial contagion. For this reason, equity 
market risk dynamics should serve as an important monitoring devise for monetary 
policy-makers. The second category of market risk that is crucial for monetary policy 
decisions is the interest rate risk, because proliferation of interest rate risk inhibits 
effectiveness of monetary policy instrumentalization. In our opinion, a successful 
implementation of monetary policy during the course of convergence to the euro ought 
to take into consideration a relative interest rate risk captured by volatility dynamics of 
short-term interest rates in the candidate country vis-à-vis the volatility of the 
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corresponding interest rate in the eurozone. This treatment allows us to assess a time 
path of an interest rate risk premium vis-à-vis the eurozone.  From this standpoint, we 
investigate volatility of the euro-candidates’ short term interest rates in relation to 
changes in the eurozone rate. Exchange rate risk is the third market risk category that 
we have chosen to scrutinize. This choice is related to instability of a possible exchange 
rate target and to unreliability of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission. Needless to say, this channel serves as a focal venue of monetary policy 
implementation in the economies converging to a common currency. Elevated exchange 
rate risk at stressful market periods obfuscates asset valuation and the price of credit in 
the banking sector. It subsequently necessitates higher interest rates and tightened credit 
conditions. Monetary authorities must be assertive to jumps in the exchange rate 
volatility as these vicissitudes distort functioning of the exchange rate channel of policy 
transmission, which has been proven to be unstable in the ECCs (Golinelli/Rovelli, 
2005; Orlowski, 2005 and 2008a; Kočenda/Valachy, 2006; Kočenda, et. al 2006). For 
the purpose of our empirical examination, we devise a simple model testing conditional 
volatility of exchange rate changes in the ECCs in response to the key determinants of 
exchange rates, i.e. the uncovered interest parity (UIP), and the purchasing power parity 
(PPP). 
Following these notions, we investigate the developments of risks in the examined 
ECCs during the past decade, with a special attention to the propagating effects brought 
forth by the ongoing financial crisis. In order to capture risk dynamics, we examine 
changes in time-varying conditional volatility of major equity market indexes, relative 
short-term interest rates, and daily changes in the euro value of local currencies in these 
countries. We use a sample period beginning January 3, 2000 and ending August 7, 
2009, with some adjustments stemming from different inception dates for secondary 
market trading of long-term government bonds.  We employ GARCH(p,q)-M-GED tests 
(the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with the in-mean variance 
and generalized error distribution) in order to investigate the conditional volatility 
dynamics. In particular, we focus on the overall risk premium (or discount) reflected by 
the positive (or negative) value of the in-mean GARCH variance coefficient (the M-
component). We further put emphasis on the degree of leptokurtosis (GED parameter < 
2), and on the relative proportion of the shocks or ‘news’ to volatility reflected by the 
ARCH(p) coefficients, as well as the persistency in volatility implied by the GARCH(1) 
coefficient. The use of the GED parameter helps to smoothly transform a non-normal 
into a normal distribution and to apply the maximum likeloohod test. The time 
distribution of conditional standard deviations from the GARCH series allows us to 
examine the sub-periods of risk contraction and proliferation. 
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Equity market risk 
We devise a model of changes in the (log of) local equity market indexes 
tr
E  as a 
dependent variable in the conditional mean equation (the return process tr ) with 
changes in (the log of) the German DAX40 index 40DAX
t
E , and the log of the GARCH 








10 logloglog  (1) 






−− ++= ttt hh σγεσ  (2) 
with the ARCH(1) component denoted by 2 1−tε  and the GARCH(1) by  
2
1−tσ .  
Interest rate risk 
We analyze changes in domestic short-term interest rates (three-month interbank 
lending rates) Mti
3 in relation to changes in the three-month Euribor Mti
3* and in the (log) 
exchange rate st. The inclusion of both independent variables allows for testing their 
possible impact on the key monetary policy variable of the central bank, and explains 
the room for an independent monetary policy pursuit. The conditional mean 











3 loglog  (3) 





2 ... −−− +++= tptptt hhh σγεεσ  (4) 
We use high-order ARCH terms in this case as they were proven to be significant in 
preliminary testing. 
Exchange rate risk 
We employ the GARCH-M-GED process ascertaining daily changes in the euro values 
in local currency ts  as a function of the changes in the differential between short-term 
interest rates (three-month interbank offer rates) of the euro-candidate 3Mti  and the 
eurozone (Euribor) 3MEti  , and changes in the term spread on ten-year less three-month 
sovereign bond yields 10 3y Mt ti i−  as a proxy of inflation expectations. We also include 
changes in the local equity market index tΕ  as a regressor in the conditional mean 
equation, in order to reflect the impact of equity capital flows on exchange rates. The 
conditional mean equation is represented by 
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( ) ( ) tttMEtMtMtYtrtt Eiiiis εσββββ ++∆+−∆+−∆+=∆ −2 1333231010 log)log(  (5) 









2 ...... qtqttptpttt hhhh −−−−−− ++++++++= σγσγσγεεεσ  (6) 
As in the previous cases, the ARCH(p) terms 2 ptph −ε represent the impact of ‘news’ or 
shocks to volatility, and the GARCH(q) terms 2q t qγ σ −  reflect the role of persistency in 
volatility3. 
IV Estimation Results 
Equity market risk developments 
The results of the GARCH-M-GED estimation (Eqs. 1 and 2) of changes in ECCs 
equity market indexes relative to changes in the German DAX40 are shown in Table 1. 
Changes in the German stock market index drive up ECC market indexes in the same 
direction, but at a varied degree of significance.  The most significant relationship for 
both indexes is detected for Hungarian and Slovak markets; the Polish and Czech 
markets show a less significant dependence on the German market movement, and the 
reaction of the Romanian market is insignificant. There is a negative risk premium on 
the Czech and Polish equity markets, as implied by the negative sign of log(GARCH) 
terms in the conditional mean equation.  In contrast, the risk premium on the Romanian 
market is significantly positive. The risk premia results for Hungary and Slovakia are 
inconclusive.  
As it is a common factor characterizing volatility of global equity markets, volatility of 
the Czech, Polish and Hungarian markets is highly persistent, as implied by GARCH 
coefficients in the conditional variance equations being close to unity. Correspondingly, 
the ARCH-type shocks to volatility in these three markets play a relatively minor role. 
The Romanian market conditional volatility series displays very different characteristics 
with a stronger role of ARCH terms and a lower degree of GARCH persistency.  
Arguably, the Romanian market is the most susceptible to unexpected shocks to 
volatility within the analyzed group of equity markets.  More importantly from the 
standpoint of our analytical objectives, the estimated GED parameters in all five equity 
                                                 
3 In the preliminary testing, we have attempted to augment the conditional volatility series (Eqs. 2,4 
and 6) with an EU accession dummy variable assuming the value of one for the period following the 
accession and zero before, in order to ascertain the impact of the EU membership on risk 
developments in the investigated series. This variable has proven to be insignificant in all examined 
cases suggesting that the EU accession has not decisively contributed to the financial stability in 
ECCs.  
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markets are significantly lower than 2, indicating considerable leptokurtosis, i.e. 
pronounced tail risks. Evidently, volatility in these markets tends to escalate 
considerably during turbulent market periods, while it remains subdued at times of 
normal market risk.  Another interesting focal point is the sum of ARCH and GARCH 
coefficients. It is very close to unity in the cases of the Czech, Polish, Hungarian and 
Romanian markets, which suggests no visible gains in volatility convergence.  The sum 
is significantly lower than the unity for the Slovak market, implying an overall reduction 
in volatility, thus a significant decline in market risk in this new member of the 
eurozone.  
Table 1:  
Changes in (the log of) equity market indexes vis-à-vis the changes in (the log of) the 
German DAX40 index 




Poland Hungary Romania Slovakia 


































































Notes: all variables are in first differences; t-statistics are in parentheses; AIC = Akaike information criterion; SIC = 
Schwartz information criterion; stock market indexes are Prague SE PX, Warsaw WIG20, Budapest BUX, Bucharest 
BET(L), Bratislava SXSAX16;  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
Source: authors’ own estimation based on Datastream. 
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The time-path of conditional volatilities for the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Slovak and 
Romanian stock market indexes is shown in Figures 1a-e (see Appendix). In all five 
cases, the market risk surged during the peak of the global financial crisis. The largest 
volatility upswings in the GARCH series took place during the period between October 
10 and mid-November of 2008 (observations range 2298-2330). All five stock markets 
took an unprecedented hit on October 10, in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse, 
which triggered the subsequent systemic risk epitomized by the standstill in 
international credit markets, coupled with the risk aversion of international investors 
that contributed to a withdrawal of capital from emerging markets. The October 10th 
market plunge was followed by a series of up-and-down swings of the ECCs’ equity 
markets, and the elevated volatility did not recede to its pre-crisis pattern until 
July/August of 2009. The analysis of volatility dynamics with respect to the pre- and the 
post-EU accession periods is also revealing. The GARCH residuals seem to gradually 
receding during the pre-accession periods in all five markets, but there is no discernible 
containment of volatility since the respective EU accessions. It can be therefore argued 
that the EU membership has not engendered stability in equity markets of the ECCs. 
Moreover, the stock market volatility in Slovakia has increased considerably even after 
its euro adoption in January 2009. The Slovak case seems to suggest that entering the 
common currency system does not insulate a local stock market from large external 
shocks, at least at times of global market vicissitudes.  These developments related to 
the EU accession and the euro adoption should be of concern for monetary authorities, 
since these moves do not automatically entail gains in financial stability. 
It can be generally concluded that equity markets in the ECCs remain highly vulnerable 
to exogenous systemic shocks, due to significant leptokurtosis, or tail-risks embedded in 
their volatility dynamics series. The likelihood of disruptive spillover effects of the 
elevated equity market risk at times of financial distress into domestic credit, investment 
and economic growth remains very high.  
Interest Rate Risk  
The results of the empirical estimation of Eqs. (3) and (4) are shown in Table 2. From 
the perspective of our analytical objectives, the most striking outcome is the extreme 
leptokurtosis of the interbank rates volatility series in all five cases in comparison with 
the equity market series. The estimated GED parameters for the ECC interbank markets 
are all very low indicating prevalence of strong tail risks. This finding highlights our 
claim that short-term interest rates of the euro-candidates are likely to jump significantly 
at times of financial distress, underscoring exceptional vulnerability of their banking 
sectors during such periods. In addition, there is a significant risk discount in the cases 
of the Romanian and Slovak rates as implied by the negative log(GARCH) coefficients 
in the conditional mean equations. These reactions are likely related to changes in inter-
bank borrowings from local versus eurozone banks. This negative path is likely related 
to the very high initial risk premiums in these two countries. At the same time, there is a 
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tiny interest rate risk discount detected in the cases of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian 
interbank rate series. The conditional volatility series of interbank rates is highly 
persistent in the cases of Polish and Hungarian interbank markets, as signified by high 
values of GARCH coefficients.  Interbank rates remain vulnerable to the ARCH-type 
shocks with non-uniform diffusion in the cases of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian 
rates.  
Table 2:  
Changes in three-months market interest rates vis-à-vis the changes in Euribor-3-months 
rates and the log of the exchange rate against the euro  
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Notes: all variables are in first differences; t-statistics are in parentheses; AIC = Akaike information criterion; SIC = 
Schwartz information criterion; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
Source: authors’ own estimation based on Datastream.  
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The graphical displays (Figures 2a-e in the Appendix) of the GARCH conditional 
standard deviation series show huge jumps in interest rate volatility coinciding in the 
cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania with the October 10, 2008 
turbulence in global financial markets, with the notable exception of Poland. 
In all, relative interest rate volatility or interest rate risk premiums in the examined 
ECCs remain very high. It also remains to be elevated in Slovakia, in spite of its new 
membership of the eurozone. This makes ECCs financial systems susceptible to large 
interest rate shocks and contagion effects at time of financial distress. Under such 
circumstances, a strict adherence of monetary policy implementation to interest rate 
rules seems both implausible and counter-productive for creating a foundation financial 
stability.  
Exchange rate risks 
The estimation results of the exchange rate volatility series specified by Eqs. (5) and (6) 
are shown in Table 3. The estimated model is multivariate and more elaborate than the 
equity market and the interbank rate series due to the overall statistical significance of 
the regressors included in the conditional mean equation.  
We find that changes in the euro values in the ECCs’ local currencies are highly 
sensitive to changes in local stock market indexes, with the notable exception of 
Slovakia, as implied by the negative signs of the equity market index coefficients 
suggesting that capital inflows to domestic equity markets correspond with the local 
currency appreciation (euro depreciation). This result highlights a strong role of foreign 
capital inflows in local market gyrations. A wider term spread on sovereign bond yields 
(10Y less 3M bond yields) corresponds with the depreciation of the Polish Zloty (PLN), 
the Czech Koruna (CZK), the Hungarian Forint (HUF) the Slovak Koruna (SKK), but 
not the Romanian Lei (RON). In the first four cases, the wider term spread translates 
into currency depreciation thus satisfying PPP conditions, as it very likely reflects rising 
long-term inflation expectations. The interest rate differential captured by the widening 
spread between local inter-bank offer rates and Euribor is associated with the 
depreciation of CZK, PLN and HUF, contrary to the UIP assumptions, since local banks 
are likely to increase borrowings in the local currency when it is expected to depreciate.  
Romania is again a notable exception. We do not detect a risk premium or discount on 
local currencies in any of the examined cases, as it is implied by insignificant 
log(GARCH) in the mean equations 4.  
 
                                                 
4 See Kočenda/Poghosyan (2009) for a more detailed examination of macroeconomic determinants of 
the exchange rate risk in the new EU Member States. Using the stochastic discount factor and 
GARCH-M modeling, they provide evidence that both nominal and real economic variables play 
important role in the determination of exchange rate risk in these countries.  
 
IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Discussion Papers 12/2010 18
Table 3:  
Changes in (the log) exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro as a function of changes in: the 
term spread on sovereign bond yields, the 3M interest rate differential and the stock  
market index.  
GARCH-M-GED estimation – Eqs.(5) and (6). Daily series; sample period Jan 3, 2000 – Aug 7, 
2009 (Apr 1, 2005 – Aug 7, 2009 for Romania; Jan 3, 2003 – Dec 31, 2008 for Slovakia). 
Variables⇓ Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Romania Slovakia 




























































































Notes: all variables are in first differences; AIC = Akaike information criterion; SIC = Schwartz information 
criterion; a minus one-day lag is applied to the Czech  3M Pribor vis-à-vis 3M Euribor; term spread reflects 10Y less 
3M sovereign bond yields; short-term interest rates are: 3M Pribor, 3M Wibor, 3M Bubor, RMIBK3M, 3M Skibor, 
3M Euribor; stock market indexes are Prague SE PX, Warsaw WIG20, Budapest BUX, Bucharest BET(L), Bratislava 
SXSAX16;  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
Source: authors’ own estimation based on Datastream and Eurostat data.  
The conditional volatility of the analyzed series is highly persistent in all five ECCs, as 
implied by GARCH(1) coefficients all being close to unity. The most significant ARCH 
shocks to volatility are detected in the case of RON, followed by the HUF, CZK and 
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PLN series. Certainly the most crucial finding of the conducted tests is the very high 
degree of leptokurtosis in the exchange rate series in all five cases, as implied by the 
estimated GED parameters significantly lower than 2. However, the extreme risk in the 
case of the exchange rate volatility series is considerably less pronounced than the one 
detected for the interbank rates series. 
Further insights to the time-varying path of exchange rate volatility are provided by 
GARCH standard deviations shown in Figures 3a-e (Appendix). During the post-EU 
accession periods, the conditional exchange rate volatility has remained subdued in the 
cases of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, but clearly not in Romania. It is 
worth noting that there have been several pronounced volatility jumps in Slovakia 
during this period. However, the country’s euro adoption in January 2009 has evidently 
helped mitigate exchange rate risk in the preceding turbulent months, which has not 
been the case in the remaining four countries. The exchange rate risk of the euro-
candidates has remained elevated considerably in the aftermath of the October 10, 2008 
peak of the global financial crisis, with some signs of returning to more normal pre-
crisis conditions taking place only in mid-2009. 
In essence, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis has impaired the process of gaining 
exchange rate stability in the analyzed ECCs, with the notable exception of Slovakia, 
whose actual euro adoption has helped cushion the transmission of global financial 
shocks. One may thus argue that the real prospects of adopting the euro, including the 
actual entry to the ERM2, may reduce exchange rate risk in these countries, thus also 
lead to a more effective absorption of external shocks.  
V Conclusion: Monetary Policy Reconsidered  
The main argument of our study is that monetary policies in the ECCs need to take into 
consideration a task of mitigating market risks and, in particular, tail-risks embedded in 
the key monetary policy target and instrument variables. But in order to fulfill this task, 
ECCs monetary policies ought to be rather unorthodox and seemingly more complex 
than those based on simple Taylor rules.  
In principle, we prescribe to the perceived dichotomy between monetary policy and 
financial-stability policy identified among others by Borio and White (2003) and 
Svensson (2010), however, with some reservations.  If there was an absolute dichotomy 
between both policies, monetary policy could follow a pre-determined rule at all times 
and financial-stability policy based on macroprudential regulation would be aimed at 
countering asset-price bubbles and unexpected volatility episodes in the time-series of 
financial variables. However, we believe that monetary policy should counteract the 
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shocks that are not transitory and can permanently imperil financial stability (aggravate 
systemic risk) by levying high risk premium on interest rates.  
Along this line of reasoning, we do not advocate policies based on “leaning against the 
wind” prescribed among others by Borio and White (2003) that call for levying some 
premium on interest rates aimed at countering proliferation of asset bubbles.  In our 
opinion, such premium would entail undesired welfare costs and induce a signal effect 
of expected bubbles that would ultimately trigger speculative currency attacks. 
Prudent monetary policies responding to possible occurrence of extreme risks ought to 
be counter-cyclical and relatively flexible. Extreme risks can be at least partially 
mitigated by forward-looking policies based on smoothed forecasts.  As suggested by 
our empirical findings, the episodes of extreme risks - particularly prevalent in the 
interbank credit markets - have seriously distorted forecasts of key monetary policy 
variables. The recent financial crisis has made these forecasts increasingly unreliable 
and inaccurate.  Our paper suggests that this distortion stems for the failure to account 
for leptokurtosis in the forecasting models. We have attempted to fix this problem by 
augmenting our GARCH volatility tests with GED parameterization. 
Our empirical investigation of the equity market-, interest rate-, and exchange rate risks 
implies that tail risks are significant in the five examined ECCs and their conditional 
volatility series distribution is leptokurtic (thick-tailed). It can be thus argued that 
volatility of these variables is likely to be subdued at normal periods, but it tends to 
explode during turbulent times. It was certainly the case during the period following the 
October 2008 peak of the current global financial crisis. This result puts severe 
challenges to the loss and reaction functions of the central banks in ECCs. Forecasting 
becomes increasingly inaccurate, which leads to a discretionary rather than a rule-based 
monetary policy. Disturbances are likely to take place in the future if the ECCs 
monetary authorities do not address adequately tail risks through a broad range of 
macro-prudential policies and emergency measures, such as sterilized interventions, 
emergency liquidity injections, currency swap lines, special lending facilities for banks, 
etc.  Possible episodes of risk explosions could be destabilizing to the financial systems 
and disruptive to the process of effective convergence to the euro. 
On a final note, we agree with the “Geneva Report” (Brunnermeier, et. al, 2009) 
suggestion that macroprudential policies should be counter-cyclical and leaning against 
the bubbles whose potential implosion could impair financial system stability.  
However, in the case of ECCs, the extreme risks of financial variables arise from asset-
price bubbles generated not only by domestic factors, but were also transmitted through 
external contagion effects.  Due to the absorption of external shocks, international 
coordination of these policies is crucial, particularly for the ECCs as a group of 
economies pursuing the joint task of adopting the euro in the not-so-distant future. 
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Appendix: Figures 
Figures 1a-e: GARCH Conditional Standard Deviation for Equity Market Index Series 
vis-à-vis German DAX40 
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Figures 2a-e: GARCH(p,q)-M-GED conditional standard deviations of daily changes in 
local 3M interbank rates in relation to changes in 3M euribor and the exchange rate, 
Eqs. (3) and (4). 
January 3, 2000 – August 7, 2009 daily series. 
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Figures 3a-e: GARCH conditional standard deviations generated from estimations of 
Eqs.(5) and (6) reported in Table 3. January 3, 2000 – August 7, 2009 daily series.  
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